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CITIZENS UNITED AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT OF LABOR LAW
Charlotte Garden*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,' the dissenting justices
forecasted a surge of money in politics. 2 These predictions proved
largely accurate. For example, "[diuring the 2012 cycle, . . . non-
party outside spending tripled 2008's total and topped $1 billion
for the first time"; super-PACs accounted for nearly two-thirds of
this amount.3 Further, more than one quarter of this spending
came from "dark money" groups, which do not disclose their
donors.' However, some post-Citizens United commenters argued
* @ 2014, Charlotte Garden. All rights reserved. LL.M., with distinction,
Georgetown University Law Center, 2010; J.D., cum laude, New York University School of
Law, 2003; B.A., with great distinction, McGill University, 2000. I would like to thank the
editors of the Stetson Law Review for their careful work on this Article, which was
prepared in connection with the Stetson University College of Law symposium, Taking
Stock of Citizens United: How the Law Has (and Has Not) Changed Four Years Later. I
would also like to thank the organizers of that symposium, particularly Professors Ciara
Torres-Spelliscy and Jason Bent.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Id. at 460 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (warning that the Court's decision "unleashes the floodgates of
corporate and union general treasury spending" on judicial elections).
3. Andrew Mayersohn, OpenSecretsblog, Four Years after Citizens United: The
Fallout, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/four-years-after-citizens
-united-the-fallout.html (Jan. 21, 2014, 12:00 a.m.). "[T]he top 32 Super PAC donors. ..
matched the $313.0 million that President Obama and Mitt Romney raised from all of
their small donors combined." Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, Billion Dollar Democracy: The
Unprecedented Role of Money in the 2012 Elections 9, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/
files/publications/BillionDollarDemocracyDemos.pdf (Jan. 2013).
4. Mayersohn, supra n. 3 ("Dark money' groups [are] nonprofits that don't disclose
their donors publicly but enjoy the same right to make independent expenditures as for-
profit corporations. Such groups spent $256 million, or just over a quarter of all non-party
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that concerns over unlimited independent spending (and its
potential partisan implication) were overblown because labor
unions were also freed of restrictions on political spending. Their
argument went as follows: business interests often split their
independent spending between Democrats and Republicans,
whereas unions give almost exclusively to Democrats; therefore, if
anything, Democrats will receive a net benefit as a direct result of
Citizens United.s In other words, the argument went, Citizens
United was actually a boon for the political left more than for the
right. That argument was grounded by the observation that,
while Citizens United itself hardly mentioned unions, the decision
nonetheless applied equally to corporations and unions; both were
freed from the challenged provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA), which imposed limits on certain independent
political spending and communications. However, while the
doctrinal premise was accurate, the prediction was not, and the
overwhelming majority of independent spending unleashed by
Citizens United has favored Republicans.'
outside spending, in the 2012 elections; how much of that money came from corporate
treasuries is unknown.").
5. See Eric Boehm, Labor Unions Benefit More from Citizens United Than Big
Conservative Donors, http://watchdog.org129000/citizens-united-koch-brothers-elections/
(Feb. 17, 2014) ("An analysis by the Sunlight Foundation, a nonprofit that tracks political
spending, of groups and individuals who wrote checks of more than $10,000 to super PACs
and other political committees found big labor outspent big business by a margin of more
than 2-to-1 during 2013."); William McQuillen, Unions Gain under Citizens United
Decision They Seek to Overturn, http://bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-18/unions-gain-under
-citizens-united-decision-they-seek-to-overturn.html (July 18, 2012, 12:00 a.m. ET) ("The
AFL-CIO, the largest U.S. labor federation, will send more than 400,000 volunteers to
campaign for President Barack Obama, aided by a decision known as Citizens United that
removed limits on independent spending by corporations and unions.").
6. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (overruling Austin and "effectively inval-
idat[ing] ... BCRA Section 203"). See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) Pub.
L. No. 107-155, § 203 (2002) (amending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and
regulating the purchase of electioneering communications).
7. Michael Beckel & Russ Choma, OpenSecretsblog, Super PACs, Nonprofits Favored
Romney over Obama: Citizens United Decision Helped Romney Neutralize Obama's
Fundraising Advantage, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/super-pacs-nonprofits
.html (Oct. 30, 2012, 6:42 p.m.) ("Super PACs and nonprofits unleashed by the Citizens
United Supreme Court decision have spent more than $840 million on the 2012 election,
with the overwhelming majority favoring Republicans, particularly GOP presidential
nominee Mitt Romney. An estimated $577 million, or roughly 69 percent, was spent by
conservative groups, compared with $237 million spent by liberal groups, or about 28
percent, with the remainder expended by other organizations.").
20141 Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law
At the same time, other legal academics and I called
attention to inconsistencies between Citizens United's reasoning
and earlier cases about the First Amendment rights of labor
unions.' These critiques focused primarily on two areas of law,
discussed in more detail in Part II: first, caselaw upholding
restrictions on certain union picketing and boycotting in the face
of First Amendment challenges;' and second, First Amendment
doctrine governing the extent to which bargaining unit members
can be compelled to pay for the costs of union representation. 0
Accordingly, I proposed shortly after the decision that Citizens
United might contain a "silver lining for labor""-a basis upon
which unions could successfully challenge decades-old restrictions
on their speech, expanding both "what unions are permitted to
say" and "with what money they can say it."1 2
Yet, in the four years since Citizens United, the opposite
has occurred. Instead of applying Citizens United's core First
Amendment principles to rationalize the First Amendment
treatment of labor unions, the Court has deepened the
misalignment between unions and other associational speakers.
The remainder of this Article explains how this came to be. It
begins by briefly recapitulating the tension between Citizens
United and earlier First Amendment cases concerning labor
unions. Then, it turns to several of the Court's post-Citizens
United First Amendment cases, illustrating how they have failed
to reconcile that tension, and in at least one case, exacerbated it.
The Article closes with some observations about this term's First
Amendment cases, which again have the potential either to begin
to close this gap or to widen it even more.
8. E.g. Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor
Speech Rights? 53 Wn. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2011); Joseph L. Guza, Student Author, A Cure
for Laryngitis: A First Amendment Challenge to the NLRA's Ban on Secondary Picketing,
59 Buff. L. Rev. 1267 (2011); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-
out Rights after Citizens United, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800 (2012); Zoran Tasid, Student
Author, The Speaker the Court Forgot: Re-evaluating NLRA Section 8(b)(4)(B)'s Secondary
Boycott Restrictions in Light of Citizens United and Sorrell, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 237
(2012); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-in Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could
Mean for Post-Citizens United Shareholder Rights, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 101 (2013).
9. Infra pt. II(B).
10. Infra pt. II(C).
11. Garden, supra n. 8, at 1.
12. Id. at 46.
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II. CITIZENS UNITED AND UNIONS: THE INITIAL TENSION
As is now well known, the Citizens United Court overturned
a provision of BCRA that banned unions or corporations from
spending their general treasury funds on communicating certain
political messages in particular ways.13 This Part briefly artic-
ulates key portions of the Citizens United Court's reasoning before
turning to the tension between that reasoning and the Court's
pre-Citizens United First Amendment jurisprudence.14
A. Citizens United's Rationale
Significantly, the Citizens United Court stressed that the
challenged campaign finance restriction was "a ban on corporate
speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a
corporation can still speak."" In other words, that BCRA left
unions and corporations the possibility of speaking through a
political action committee (which would be subject to a separate
regulatory regime, including restrictions on funding sources) was
insufficient to cure any First Amendment violation." This was in
part because PACs are "separate association[s]" from sponsoring
corporations, but also because PACs are "burdensome alterna-
tives" that "are expensive to administer and subject to extensive
regulations." The Court reasoned that this regulatory regime
imposed burdens that ultimately deterred political speech, and
was therefore subject to strict scrutiny.'8
The Court emphasized that BCRA's independent expenditure
limits applied only to certain speakers-namely corporations and
unions, though the Court focused almost exclusively on cor-
porations. This troubled the majority, which emphasized its skep-
ticism of "[sipeech restrictions based on the identity of the
13. 558 U.S. at 365. The relevant portions of BCRA covered independent expendi-
tures that qualified as "speech defined as an 'electioneering communication' or for speech
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate." Id. at 318-319 (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b (2006)).
14. I discuss the Citizens United Court's rationale in greater detail in Garden, supra
n. 8, at 6-11.
15. 558 U.S. at 337.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 339-340.
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speaker"" by employing the well-trod marketplace of ideas
metaphor:" "By taking the right to speak from some and giving it
to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or
class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth,
standing, and respect for the speaker's voice."2 1 Accordingly, that
many of the corporate speakers subject to BCRA likely sought to
gain advantage in the literal marketplace through their participa-
tion in the metaphorical one did not diminish the strength of
their First Amendment claim.2 2
The Court did acknowledge that some previous cases had
upheld "speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of
certain persons," citing a string of cases.23 These cases, according
to the Court, were distinguishable from Citizens United because
they involved "an interest in allowing governmental entities to
perform their functions. 24 While two of the cases the Court cited
involved labor movement plaintiffs, neither concerned what one
might think of as traditional labor law. Rather, Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.2 5 was a First Amendment
challenge to a set of prison regulations that prohibited union
meetings, membership solicitations, and mass mailings;26 United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO 27 was a challenge to the Hatch Act's prohibi-
tion on federal employees' participation in certain political activ-
ity.28 Thus, the Court did not acknowledge, much less grapple
with, the cases discussed below,2 9 which accept that unions receive
less First Amendment protection than other entities engaged in
19. Id. at 340.
20. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 Duke L.J. 821, 824-
825, n. 7 (2008) ("Never before or since has a Justice conceived a metaphor that has done
so much to change the way that courts, lawyers, and the public understand an entire area
of constitutional law."). The marketplace of ideas metaphor has also been subject to
significant and persuasive critique. Id. at 831.
21. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340-341.
22. See id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "the corporation must engage
the electoral process with the aim 'to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter
how persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priorities'").
23. Id. at 341.
24. Id.
25. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
26. Id. at 121.
27. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
28. Id. at 550.
29. Infra pts. II(B), (C).
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similar speech based on their identity and apparent economic
purpose.
The Court also rejected three potential compelling state
interests, holding they were insufficient to satisfy strict
scrutiny." Two of these, the "antidistortion" and "shareholder
protection" rationales, are relevant to this Article." First, the
Court held that the antidistortion rationale (the state's interest in
equalizing speakers' resources to prevent one especially well-
funded voice from drowning out competing voices) was simply
invalid because it "interferes with the 'open marketplace' of ideas
protected by the First Amendment."" Second, the Court also
rejected the government's interest in protecting shareholders
from having their investments used to fund political speech with
which they disagree.3 3 Here, the Court's discussion was relatively
brief, and it focused primarily on the difficulty of allowing the
government to restrict the speech of media corporations based on
this interest. However, the Court also maintained that there
was "little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate democracy.
Thus, the Court struck down the challenged independent
expenditure provisions of BCRA (though it upheld BCRA's
disclosure and disclaimer requirements).36 Much of the commen-
tary that followed focused on how Citizens United would affect
the political process. However, some legal academics also drew
attention to the ways in which Citizens United's articulation of
First Amendment principles stands in tension with certain First
Amendment cases arising in the context of labor law." That
commentary focused on two areas: labor picketing and boycotts;
30. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-362.
31. The third proposed and rejected rationale rested on the government's interest in
avoiding public corruption. Id. at 360-361. The Court concluded that there was no empir-
ical evidence supporting the proposition that independent expenditures led to corruption.
Id.
32. Id. at 354 (citing N.Y. St. Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008)).
33. Id. at 361.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 361-362 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794
(1978)).
36. Id. at 365, 371.
37. Supra n. 8.
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and the extent to which union-represented employees could be
required to pay union dues and fees.
B. Labor Protest and Citizens United
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) contains a number
of restrictions on when, why, and how labor unions can picket,
boycott, and strike." For example, unions face significant
restrictions on picketing designed to achieve particular goals,
such as to encourage an employer to recognize and bargain with
an employee." Likewise-and of importance for purposes of this
Article-unions may not engage in or picket in support of certain
secondary strikes and boycotts.40 Nonetheless, the Court has
consistently rejected First Amendment challenges to these limits.
The Court initially rejected First Amendment challenges to
labor law's limits on union protest tactics based on the idea that
those tactics, including labor picketing, were at least part coercive
conduct.4 ' However, as the Court began to protect picketing as
core First Amendment activity in other contexts, especially the
civil rights context, it also distinguished earlier labor picketing
cases, leaving their holdings intact. The Court drew a distinction
between "[p]ublic-issue picketing" "on issues of broader social
concern,"42 and labor picketing, which the Court viewed as
retaining a "private and economic character."" In addition, the
Court has applied similar reasoning in the context of strikes and
boycotts. For example, when the FTC sought to impose antitrust
liability on a group of striking attorneys, the Court rejected the
group's First Amendment defense on the ground that the strikers'
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b), (e) (2012).
39. Id. at § 158(b)(7).
40. Id. at § 158(b)(4). A "secondary boycott" is a boycott of an employer with whom the
union does not have a labor dispute, but who does business with the employer with whom
the union has a dispute. The goal of a secondary boycott is to convince the secondary (neu-
tral) employer to exert pressure on the primary employer by, for example, withdrawing its
custom. Id.; Garden, supra n. 8, at 22 n. 84 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 912-913 (1982)).
41. Garden, supra n. 8, at 19.
42. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465-466 (1980).




goals were economic, even if their rhetoric might have been
compatible with loftier goals.'
Thus, even while it has held that the First Amendment
robustly protects protest activity by other social movement
groups, the Court has also upheld significant limits on similar
activity by labor unions.45 As I have previously explained in
greater detail, this apparent different treatment has often been
based on the Court's perception that labor union activity has a
primarily economic motive, in contrast to that of other social
movement groups.
Alone, this principle might be reconciled with Citizens
United, albeit with some difficulty. The Citizens United Court
focused on speech that was, on its face, political, even if it was
motivated by economic concerns.4 7 Thus, it might be the case that
the Court was simply distinguishing election-related speech from
speech about a private labor dispute. However, the Court has also
rejected First Amendment challenges to the application of the
NLRA to overtly political protest by unions, calling such activity
"'more rather than less objectionable"' because it was in pursuit of
a "random political objective" that was beyond the union's
appropriate role.4 ' Thus, for this distinction to hold explanatory
force, it would have to turn on the presence of election speech,
rather than political speech more broadly-a distinction that
seems tenuous at best and that, as I discuss in the next part, is
ruled out by later cases.
44. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Super. Ct. Tr. Laws. Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425-428 (1990).
45. Compare Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-227
(1982) (concluding that the NLRA prohibition on secondary activity did not violate the
First Amendment in context of the secondary strike of a Soviet shipping company aimed at
pressuring Soviet government over invasion of Afghanistan) with Claiborne Hardware,
458 U.S. at 912-913 (overturning on First Amendment grounds tort liability imposed on
NAACP as result of secondary picketing and consumer boycott).
46. Garden, supra n. 8, at 23-26.
47. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339, 351 (discussing the restriction of corporate
expenditures resulting in a ban on political speech and the economics involved in political
speech).
48. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 456 U.S. at 225-226 (quoting the circuit court's
opinion in Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378
(1st Cir. 1981)). See also Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic
Rights, 71 Va. L. Rev. 685, 736 (1985) (arguing that, contrary to the Supreme Court's
approach, "[m]ost of labor law... should extend to political as well as to bargaining
activity"). Moreover, as discussed below, the Court has recently extended Citizens United's
principle of speaker neutrality to the context of commercial speech.
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Accordingly, it is, to say the least, difficult to reconcile labor
protest cases with the Court's insistence in Citizens United that
government should not distinguish among speakers, except in the
narrow circumstances in which one category of speakers uniquely
affects government functioning. 9 Moreover, the Citizens United
Court squarely rejected any suggestion either that economic
speakers' political interventions were less worthy of protection
than those of other types of speakers or that the presence of an
economic motive should affect the amount of First Amendment
protection afforded to speech.o Instead, Citizens United was clear
that the content of the speech alone should determine whether
and how the First Amendment applies. Accordingly, in the wake
of Citizens United, I wrote that
the Court has repeatedly held that unions' and workers' "eco-
nomic" goals mean that their speech is entitled to less First
Amendment protection than tactically similar-but, in the
Court's view, politically motivated-speech. In contrast, the
Citizens United Court held that the fact that the goal of
corporate political speech was profit did not detract from its
level of First Amendment protection.
Thus, in the wake of Citizens United, the Court has four
possible paths available to it in the event that it considers a
renewed challenge to restrictions on union protest. First, it could
articulate a new ground on which to distinguish unions from
other speakers (or union speech from others' speech); second, it
could apply the First Amendment more robustly to union
expression, possibly striking down limits on union speech; third,
it could limit Citizens United; fourth, it could leave the different
49. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340-341.
50. Id. at 351, 353-354.
51. Garden, supra n. 8, at 26-27. Others, too, have observed this apparent discrep-
ancy between the First Amendment law of labor and the Citizens United Court's emphasis
that a speaker's identity as a for-profit corporation could have no bearing on the First
Amendment protection afforded to the corporation's speech. Guza, supra n. 8, at 1299-
1300 (arguing that Citizens United is inconsistent with secondary boycott prohibition and
reasoning that "[slince labor speech can be considered to be fundamentally political in
nature, labor communications should be afforded the same protection as other types of
political speech under the First Amendment"); Tasi6, supra n. 8, at 239-240 (arguing that,
after Citizens United, "it follows that union speech, whether on political or economic
matters, should be treated no differently by the Court than similar speech by corporations,
non-corporate institutions, and individuals").
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rules in place without explanation. To date, the Court has not
considered a case squarely raising a First Amendment challenge
to limits on union protest tactics, so it remains unclear which
option the Court will choose. However, other cases suggest the
third option is unlikely; the Court has rejected multiple opportu-
nities arising in different contexts to limit the First Amendment
principles articulated in Citizens United. I discuss these cases
below, showing how they have only deepened the tension between
labor's First Amendment principles and other First Amendment
doctrine.
C. Union Fees and Citizens United
A second area of tension between labor's First Amendment
principles and Citizens United arises in the context of union dues
and fees, specifically the Court-created procedure designed to
protect public sector workers who object either to union
membership or to paying union dues.
Labor unions in both the public and private sector almost
always represent groups of workers (known as "bargaining units")
on an exclusive basis. This means that, if a union is duly elected
by a majority of workers within a bargaining unit, it then
represents every worker in the unit-including those who voted
against representation-in bargaining and during the life of the
contract.52 In part because individual bargaining unit members
cannot opt out of union representation and negotiate independ-
ently, the NLRB and the Supreme Court have imposed on unions
52. In the private sector, unions and employers are permitted to agree to "members
only" representation in which the union represents only those employees who elect
representation. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 239 (1938). However,
such an arrangement requires the consent of both the union and employer. Clyde W.
Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a "Unique" American
Principle, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Policy J. 47, 57 (1998) ("[a]lthough there is no duty on the
employer to bargain with a minority union, if a minority union is able to obtain a contract,
a 'members only' contract is legal and enforceable in the absence of a majority union"). In
the public sector, nearly all jurisdictions require exclusive representation. See Martin H.
Malin, Life after Act 10?: Is There a Future for Collective Representation of Wisconsin
Public Employees? 96 Marquette L. Rev. 623, 640 (2012) (noting that the exclusive
representation system was "adapted to the public sector in most public employee labor
relations acts"); Joseph E. Slater, Public-Sector Labor Law in the Age of Obama, 87 Ind.
L.J. 189, 228 (2012) (observing that "public-sector labor laws have many fundamental
rules in common with each other," including "using an exclusive majority representative
chosen by the employees").
[Vol. 43580
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a duty of fair representation-a duty that is breached if a union
represents one or more bargaining unit members arbitrarily,
discriminatorily, or in bad faith."
Because fairly representing workers can lead unions to incur
considerable expense, many American jurisdictions permit unions
to negotiate union security agreements,5 4 which require repre-
sented workers to pay for the costs of representation. In the
public sector (and also in the context of private employment
governed by the Railway Labor Act), these agreements have been
held to implicate the First Amendment rights of workers and
consequently have been the subject of a string of Supreme Court
cases." Over the course of these cases, the Court has struck a
balance between interests of workers, employers, and unions. The
leading case in this area, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,6
held that union-represented public sector workers could be
required to pay the costs of core union activities-bargaining,
grievance administration, and similar activities. However,
Abood continued, workers could not be required to pay their share
of the costs of other union activities that were both particularly
significant infringements of workers' First Amendment rights
and also peripheral to union representation at individual
workplaces-such as lobbying governments or supporting
political candidates." In sum, union-represented workers can be
required to pay their share of expenses that are germane to
workplace representation, but not other union costs including
union political speech.
53. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
54. In contrast, "right to work" states forbid unions and employers from agreeing to
require employees to pay anything to a union as a condition of employment. See Lincoln
Fed. Lab. Union v. N. W. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 530-531 (1949) (upholding
validity of right to work laws in NLRA context).
55. In the public sector and in the context of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the Court
has squarely held that the First Amendment is implicated when workers are required to
pay for union representation. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455
(1984) (RLA); Abood v. Det. Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 229-232 (1977) (public sector); Ry.
Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (RLA). In the private sector, the
Court has held that the same analysis applies as a matter of constitutional avoidance.
Commc'n Workers ofAm. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761-762 (1988).
56. 431 U.S. 209.
57. Id. at 225-226, 232.
58. Id. at 234-235.
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In a 1991 case, Justice Scalia explained the reasoning behind
this balance, addressing why the Court did not simply hold that
objectors had an absolute right to refuse to pay for any costs of
union representation:
Our First Amendment jurisprudence therefore recognizes a
correlation between the rights and the duties of the union, on
the one hand, and the nonunion members of the bargaining
unit, on the other. Where the state imposes upon the union a
duty to deliver services, it may permit the union to demand
reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the other end,
where the state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement
from the union, it may compel them to pay the cost.... In the
context of bargaining, a union must seek to further the
interests of its nonmembers; it cannot, for example, negotiate
particularly high wage increases for its members in exchange
for accepting no increases for others. Thus, the free ridership
(if it were left to be that) would be not incidental but calcu-
lated, not imposed by circumstances but mandated by gov-
ernment decree.59
Where public sector unions and employers do agree to require
bargaining unit members to pay their fair share of the costs of
union representation (known as the agency fee), the Supreme
Court has also mandated that the unions implement a set of
procedural protections designed to assist employees in exercising
their rights to pay only the agency fee and not other costs
incurred by the union.6 0 These protections, known as Hudson
procedures, involve annual notice of bargaining member rights as
well as an opportunity to exercise those rights to opt out of paying
the full amount of union dues. 1 In addition, unions must provide
a procedure for "reasonably prompt" review of the union's calcula-
tion of the agency fee by an "impartial decisionmaker," among
other protections.6 ' Further, the Court recently held that, in the
context of mid-year dues increases, unions may not require all
bargaining unit members who do not opt out to pay the full
59. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
60. Chi. Teachers Union, Loc. No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1986).
61. Id. at 305-306.
62. Id. at 310.
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amount of union dues; instead, unions must presume objection
and charge full freight to only those bargaining unit members
who indicate a preference to pay.6 3 (This decision, which post-
dates Citizens United, is discussed in greater detail below.)
While union objectors are not identically situated to the
shareholder objectors that the Court discussed in Citizens United,
there are some important similarities between the two groups.
First, the nature of their objection is similar-both object to
paying money to a private organization (a corporation or a union)
if the money might be used for political expression. Second, both
sets of objectors have generally affiliated with the corporate or
labor organization because of the prospect of economic gain. Yet,
whereas the Court has carefully protected dissenting bargaining
unit members, the Citizens United Court was dismissive of the
asserted interest in protecting dissenting shareholders. In little
63. Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2306 (2012).
64. There is much to say about the strength of the correlation between union and
shareholder objections. Benjamin Sachs persuasively argues that the bases upon which
the corporate and union contexts might be distinguished are insufficient to compel
different First Amendment analyses. Sachs, supra n. 8, at 858-862. Similarly, Catherine
Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky argue that "at the very least, corporations and unions
should be treated the same in terms of their speech rights as entities and the rights of
dissenting shareholders and members." Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political
Speech and Association Rights after Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1023,
1080 (2013). However, Todd Pettys argues that "one can sensibly resist the premise that
dissenting shareholders and dissenting employees are comparably situated for First
Amendment purposes." Todd E. Pettys, Unions, Corporations, and the First Amendment: A
Response to Professors Fisk & Chemerinsky, 99 Cornell L. Rev. Online 23, 32 (2013). Pettys
argues that there are two key differences between dissenting shareholders and dissenting
bargaining unit members. First, that, "[u]nlike dissenting employees who immediately feel
the financial bite of a union's political activities," corporate political advocacy may not
actually cost anything because political speech may not devalue the company. Id. at 30.
Second, that there is a greater likelihood that a listener would associate a union's speech
with a bargaining unit member than a corporation's speech with a shareholder. Id. at 30-
31. This important debate is largely beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, it is sufficient
for my purposes to note that there are significant similarities between the two contexts
and that individual union members and shareholders may have a relatively easy or
difficult time avoiding the risk of funding objectionable political speech. For example, just
as some shareholders will find that their shares are not devalued by corporate political
speech, some bargaining unit members will find that collective bargaining results in a
raise that dwarfs the amount of union dues or fees. Similarly, listeners who are familiar
with the principle of exclusive representation will know not to attribute union speech to
individual bargaining unit members, though whether such awareness is prevalent is an
empirical question.
65. Sachs, supra n. 8, at 809-810.
66. Id. at 825-826.
67. Id. at 802-803.
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more than one paragraph, the Court reasoned that shareholder
democracy was a sufficient bulwark against unwanted political
spending; yet, this does not explain the different treatment, given
that bargaining unit members also possess democratic rights.
A further inconsistency between the two lines of cases lies in
how the Court weighs-or fails to weigh-union First Amendment
interests in cases about objectors' rights under Hudson and
related cases. Specifically, the Citizens United Court was clear
that procedural burdens on speech implicate the speaker's First
Amendment rights." Yet the Court has not considered unions'
First Amendment rights to speak using funds paid by willing
members in Hudson or subsequent cases, instead focusing on:
(1) the objectors' rights to avoid funding unwanted speech; and
(2) government interests in promoting labor peace by preventing
objectors from free riding on the union's efforts on behalf of the
entire bargaining unit.'
This Part has reviewed key inconsistencies between Citizens
United and union-related First Amendment doctrine. In the next
Part, I turn to post-Citizens United cases, explaining how they
have failed to resolve, or in some cases exacerbated, existing
doctrinal tensions.
III FOUR YEARS LATER: GROWING TENSIONS
In the four years since Citizens United, the Court has decided
several more First Amendment cases. Three of these arose in the
context of campaign finance, giving the Court square opportu-
nities to either underscore or to limit Citizens United; in each, the
Court reaffirmed Citizens United in a sharply divided opinion.7 2
68. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 64, at 1081-1084 (comparing shareholder and
union democracy). In addition to the aspects of union democracy that Fisk and
Chemerinsky point to, bargaining unit members may also attempt to decertify their union.
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (providing for decertification election); see also
Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 437 (2002) (describing "[t]he possibility of a
decertification election").
69. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 64, at 1084.
70. 558 U.S. at 337-339.
71. Garden, supra n. 8, at 40-41.
72. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Am. Tradition
P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491-2492 (2012) (holding unconstitutional a
Montana statute regulating independent expenditures); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom
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This Part, however, focuses on First Amendment cases arising
outside of the election law context in which the Court emphasized
the First Amendment principles from Citizens United, discussed
above. These cases mostly did not involve labor speakers and so
did not present an opportunity to reconcile labor's First
Amendment principles with Citizens United principles-with the
significant exception of Knox v. Service Employees International
Union, Local 1000,73 in which the Court extended its agency fee
jurisprudence in spite of the logical tension with Citizens
United.74 Taken together, then, these post-Citizens United cases
show that while Citizens United is robust precedent for corporate
and other associational speakers, the same has not yet proven to
be true for labor union speakers.
A. Strengthening Corporate and Associational Speech Rights
One of the most significant recent cases for corporate
speakers, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.," saw the Court extend
Citizens United's reasoning into the commercial speech context.
Sorrell involved a Vermont law restricting the sale or use of
certain pharmacy records that revealed doctors' prescribing
practices." While these records could be used for a number of
purposes, the law forbade their use for marketing purposes by
pharmaceutical companies.7 Specifically, the Vermont law
targeted the practice of pharmacies mining and selling data
from individual prescriptions that, in the aggregate, revealed
doctors' prescribing habits." Pharmaceutical manufacturers then
purchased this data and used it to tailor their marketing to indi-
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2811, 2828-2829 (2011) (holding unconstitutional an
Arizona statute making additional public financing available to candidates whose
opponents and their supporters spent above a threshold amount). McCutcheon is discussed
in greater detail in Part IV.
73. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
74. Id. at 2295-2296.
75. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
76. Task, supra n. 8, at 268-278. Tasi6 makes a similar argument about the extension
of Citizens United into the commercial speech context in Sorrell and the exclusion, to date,
of unions from the emerging First Amendment principle against speaker-based distinc-
tions. Id. at 272-278.





vidual doctors (a practice known as "detailing").8 0 Data miners
and an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers brought
suit,s" claiming that the law violated their First Amendment
rights. Their fundamental claim was that Vermont prohibited
commercial activity (the sales or use of the prescribing informa-
tion) based on the content of the manufacturers' speech-
marketing speech, rather than speech for another purpose."
Without citing Citizens United, Justice Kennedy-who wrote
for the majority both in that case and Sorrell-used very similar
language and legal reasoning to articulate why the Vermont law
violated the First Amendment. As he described the case, the key
problem was that "Vermont's law enact[ed] content- and speaker-
based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-
identifying information."8 3 He added that "[tihe law on its face
burden[ed] disfavored speech by disfavored speakers."8 4 The
Court then applied "heightened scrutiny," though it did not decide
with precision what version of heightened scrutiny applied-as
the Court saw it, there was no need to decide because the statute
failed even under the more permissive commercial speech test.8 5
However, the Court's language suggests that the principle that
only intermediate (and not strict) First Amendment scrutiny
applies in the context of commercial speech is, at minimum,
eroded in the context of content- or speaker-based distinctions.
As in Citizens United, the Court in Sorrell was indifferent to
the fact that the affected speech was economically motivated,
observing that "a great deal of vital expression" results from an
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2661.
82. Id. at 2662.
83. Id. at 2662-2663.
84. Id. at 2663.
85. Id. at 2664, 2667 (stating that "the outcome is the same whether a special com-
mercial speech inquiry or a stricter form ofjudicial scrutiny is applied").
86. Id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority is "suggesting a
standard yet stricter than Central Hudson"); Samantha Rauer, Student Author, When the
First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The Court's Increasingly Strict Constitutional
Scrutiny of Health Regulations That Restrict Commercial Speech, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 690,
706 (2012) ("If Sorrell controls future decisions, the traditional intermediate commercial
speech doctrine may disappear entirely."); Recent Cases, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 799-800
(2013); Nat Stern, Secondary Speech and the Protective Approach to Interpretive Dualities
in the Roberts Court, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 133, 147-148 (2013).
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economic motive." Further, the Court rejected the argument that
the sale of prescriber-identifying information was conduct rather
than speech, reasoning that the process of obtaining information
was necessarily intertwined with speech" so that banning the
prior was equivalent to banning the latter: "Vermont's statute
could be compared with a law prohibiting trade magazines from
purchasing or using ink."" Sorrell thus underscores the
proposition from Citizens United that speaker-based distinctions
are subject to close First Amendment scrutiny, further undermin-
ing the Court's previous cases distinguishing between union
picketing and civil rights picketing based on unions' apparent
economic motives or roles.
Sorrell is not the only post-Citizens United case that bears on
the ongoing validity of the union picketing cases. In addition,
there is Snyder v. Phelps,"o in which the Court held that the First
Amendment precludes imposition of tort liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress on funeral picketers.9' In short,
Snyder undermines the union picketing cases to the extent that
they rest upon reasoning that union picketing can be regulated
because of the response it is likely to cause.
Snyder arose following the Westboro Baptist Church's
picketing at a soldier's funeral.93 The soldier's family successfully
87. 131 S. Ct. at 2665.
88. Id. at 2665, 2667 (stating that "[a]n individual's right to speak is implicated when
information he or she possesses is subjected to 'restraints on the way in which the
information might be used'") (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32
(1984)).
89. Id. at 2667.
90. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
91. Id. at 1220.
92. In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring), Justice Stevens reasoned that labor picketing could be
distinguished from other picketing because the former "calls for an automatic response to
a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea." Justice Stevens relied on an earlier
labor picketing decision in which Justice Douglas wrote in a concurrence that "[plicketing
by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular
locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence
those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation." Id. (citing Bakery
Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777 (1942)). Other commentators and I have criticized
this analysis. E.g. Michael C. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 Yale L.J. 409,
440-441 (1984).
93. 131 S. Ct. at 1213-1214.
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sued Westboro, and a jury awarded nearly $11 million in
compensatory and punitive damages. 94 Striking down the
imposition of liability, the Court stated in strong terms that the
likely effects on listeners or viewers did not qualify as reasons to
restrict speech:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to
tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great
pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by
punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different
course-to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to
ensure that we do not stifle public debate.9 5
While Snyder concerned harmful speech that listeners hoped
to avoid, the Court confirmed in Sorrell that the inverse was also
true: the First Amendment is inconsistent with limiting speech
because it is too effective. Thus, citing Snyder, the Sorrell Court
held that effects on doctors-the risk that pharmaceutical
marketers would "undermine[I the doctor-patient relationship by
allowing detailers to influence treatment decisions" through
"unwanted pressure" and even more egregious conduct-could not
support Vermont's ban." Though the Court questioned whether
these effects were likely, it ultimately decided that the answer did
not matter because "this asserted interest is contrary to basic
First Amendment principles.... If pharmaceutical marketing
affects treatment decisions, it does so because doctors find it
persuasive."7 This language in particular undermines the signal
picketing analysis inasmuch as it reflects the Court's unwilling-
ness to look behind doctors' prescribing decisions, even in the face
of the argument that pharmaceutical marketers engaged in
conduct amounting to manipulation in order to persuade doctors.
In sum, while the Court has not had occasion to consider a
labor picketing case since Citizens United, its First Amendment
decisions continue to chip away at the reasoning of the Court's
previous labor protest cases. In the next Subpart, I turn to agency
94. Id. at 1214. The district court later reduced the punitive damages award from $8
million to $2.1 million. Id.
95. Id. at 1220.
96. 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id.
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fee cases-an area in which the Court has spoken post-Citizens
United.
B. Agency Fees, Public Employees, and Structuring Costs
As described above, the Court's agency fee cases stand in
significant tension with Citizens United. This is for at least two
reasons: first, the Court has failed to account for unions' own
First Amendment interests in engaging in political speech; and
second (and closely related), the Court has not treated the
burdens associated with the Hudson procedures as burdens on
speech."
These tensions were exacerbated, rather than resolved, when
the Court addressed a question related to Hudson procedures in
Knox." Knox involved a mid-year dues increase charged by
Service Employees International Local 1000 (SEIU) to repre-
sented public employees."oo The SEIU did not offer covered
employees a new opportunity to exercise their Abood rights to
object to paying the nonchargeable portion of dues, though it did
honor previous opt-outs.'0o
The Court held that the dues increase unconstitutionally
infringed the First Amendment rights of the objectors because the
union had not ensured an adequate opportunity to object to
paying the nonchargeable portion of the increase. 1 02 However, like
in the (pre-Citizens United) Abood/Hudson line of cases, the Court
focused only on the rights of objectors, ignoring union First
Amendment rights that were also implicated in the case.' This
stance-that there were First Amendment rights at stake on just
one side of the case-led the Court to observe that "[aicceptance
of the free-rider argument as a justification for compelling
nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents something
98. Supra n. 64 and accompanying text.
99. 132 S. Ct. at 2284.
100. Id. at 2285. Although the increase was earmarked for a "Political Fight-Back
Fund," the money ultimately was used for collective bargaining costs for which objectors
may be required to pay. Id.
101. Id. at 2286.
102. Id. at 2295-2296.
103. Id. at 2284.
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of an anomaly-one that we have found to be justified by the
interest in furthering 'labor peace.""04
As a result, the Court widened the incongruity between Citi-
zens United and the law of union fees yet further. It held that
unions assessing mid-year dues increases were required to obtain
affirmative consent from employees rather than requiring
objectors to opt out of paying.o' Further, the Court strongly
implied that it would adopt the same rule for all union dues
assessments in a future case; indeed, there is little basis upon
which to distinguish a mid-year dues increase from an annual
dues assessment.
Finally, as Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky have
demonstrated, there exists a further, and related, tension in the
First Amendment of labor law, which stems from the Court's
differing approaches to public employees' First Amendment rights
in and out of the union context.'06 While this tension does not
relate directly to Citizens United, it is worth briefly addressing
because it has also been continued in a recent First Amendment
case.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,o' the Court held that "there is no
First Amendment protection against adverse employment action
for the speech of government employees made on the job and ...
within the scope of their duties."o' Yet the Court's agency fee
cases start from the premise that employees' First Amendment
rights are infringed when their employers agree to require
employees to pay a fee to their unions; as Fisk and Chemerinsky
put it, "the government employees in Knox were being asked to
pay the assessment precisely because they were government
employees and were speaking in this capacity through their
union."' 9 The tension, then, is that while public employees' "on
the job" speech receives no First Amendment protection in most
cases, the Court robustly protects employees from having to pay
union dues as a condition of public employment.
104. Id. at 2290.
105. Id. at 2296.
106. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 64, at 1064.
107. 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
108. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 64, at 1064-1065.
109. Id. at 1066.
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Then, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri," the Court again
considered the limits on public employees' First Amendment
rights."'1 Whereas Garcetti concerned speech that occurred
squarely in the course of the plaintiffs employment, Borough of
Duryea involved alleged retaliation against an employee for filing
a union grievance and then a federal lawsuit, in violation of his
right to petition the government.11 The Court rejected the claim,
concluding that public employees may successfully invoke the
First Amendment right to petition only when their petition
addresses a matter of public concern."' The Court emphasized
that public employers must have substantial leeway to manage
their employees: "The government's interest in managing its
internal affairs requires proper restraints on the invocation of
rights by employees when the workplace or the government
employer's responsibilities may be affected."114
Moreover, while not deciding whether the Plaintiffs own
petition involved a matter of public concern, the Court indicated
that many petitions involving working conditions will not rise to
that level."' Thus, even if an obligation to pay dues or fees to a
union does not qualify as speech made on the job and within the
scope of public employees' duties, Borough of Duryea suggests
that it could nonetheless receive "relatively little" protection."'
However, the Court in Knox analyzed the public employee
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights without citing either Garcetti
or Borough of Duryea (or earlier cases concerning public
employees' First Amendment rights), without discussing the
reason for its reliance on cases arising outside the public
employment context (where "government has significantly greater
110. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
111. Id. at 2491.
112. Id. at 2492.
113. Id. at 2491. The public concern test was first announced in the context of public
employee speech; Duryea extended that test to the petition context. Id. at 2493 (citing
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
114. Id. at 2497.
115. Id. at 2501 ("The right of a public employee under the Petition Clause is a right to
participate as a citizen, through petitioning activity, in the democratic process. It is not a
right to transform everyday employment disputes into matters for constitutional litigation
in the federal courts.").
116. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 64, at 1066.
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leeway""'), and without explaining why it did not afford its usual
leeway to public employers to manage their workforces.
Thus, in the agency fee context, the divide wrought by Citi-
zens United has only increased. Further, Knox's implication-that
the current Court does not consider Citizens United's principles to
be translatable into the labor union context-could carry over to
the First Amendment law of labor protest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The growing doctrinal inconsistencies between Citizens
United and the cases that have followed it and the First
Amendment of labor law are cause for concern. They mean that
even the limited formal equality between corporate and union
speakers that exists under Citizens United is illusory. Further,
two First Amendment cases before the Court this term could
increase this misalignment. First, in McCutcheon v. Federal
Elections Commission," the Court struck down biennial limits on
contributions to certain political action committees controlled by
candidates or political parties as violations of the First
Amendment."' The Court held that the only legitimate
government justification that can justify limits on campaign
contributions is the prevention of corruption, which the Court
also defined narrowly.120 Though the challenged provisions
applied to individuals, the reasoning of cases like Citizens United
and Sorrell suggests that the Court will later extend the same
principles to corporate and union speakers. Second, in Harris v.
Quinn,121 the Court will reconsider the balance struck in Abood,
potentially holding that dissenters cannot be compelled to pay for
even the core costs of union representation. If the Court does so
hold, many unions will be required to spend money which could
have otherwise been contributed to candidates on fulfilling their
117. Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dept of Agric., 553 U.S. 591,
599 (2008)).
118. 134 S. Ct. at 1434.
119. Id. at 1442.
120. Id. at 1450 ("Congress may target only a specific type of corruption-'quid pro quo'
corruption," as well as its appearance).
121. 656 F.3d 692, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 48 (2013).
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duties to fairly represent all bargaining unit members, including
those who have chosen to free ride.
If the Court strikes down both the contribution limits and
Abood, unions will be further disadvantaged in their relative
abilities to engage in political speech, while other wealthy
speakers will have increased opportunities for such speech. This
misalignment will mean fewer chances for workers to have their
interests represented in government, with wide-ranging policy
consequences.

